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LANDLORD & TENANT
I. PROTECTIVE ORDER
A protective order is an equitable device created by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit' which issues upon
the motion of the landlord and requires the tenant to deposit into the court
registry his full monthly rent ("protective payments") for the period of liti-
gation. Generally, the order issues when the landlord files a suit for the
possession of property based on nonpayment of rent.2 The order is
designed to ensure that a landlord who is successful in a prolonged litiga-
tion will be able to recover rental income which accrued during the course
of litigation.3 In 1981, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued
several significant decisions regarding the use and effect of protective
orders.
A. Timeliness of Protective Payments
In the recent case of Davis v. RentalAssociates, Inc. ,4 a tenant breached
a protective order by failing to make the required protective payments.
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion by striking the tenant's pleadings for failing to
comply with the protective order, and later, by failing to vacate its judg-
ment.
The tenant in Davis raised two issues before the court of appeals:
whether protective orders are consistent with the due process clause of the
fifth amendment5 and whether the trial court abused its discretion by not
granting appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment.6 Since the Da-
vis court held that the trial court abused its discretion, it was unnecessary
for the court to explore the possible constitutional tension between the due
1. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2. See generall Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bell v. Tsintolas
Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Armwood v. Rental Assocs., Inc. 429 A.2d 190
(D.C. 1981); McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1975); National Capital Hous. Auth. v.
Douglas, 333 A.2d 55 (D.C. 1975).
3. See Bell, 430 F.2d at 482.
4. 431 A.2d 23 (D.C. 1981).
5. Id at 25.
6. Id
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process clause and the protective order.7
After the court issued a protective order, the tenant in Davis failed to
make the required protective payments for November and December,
1979, and January 1980. At a hearing on February 12, 1980 (nine days
before the scheduled trial on the merits) the trial court granted the land-
lord's motion for a judgment of possession based on the tenant's failure to
comply with the protective order.8 After obtaining a stay in the execution
of the trial court's judgment, the tenant moved to vacate the judgment and
informed the court that she was able immediately to pay the entire amount
in arrears and proceed to trial the next day.9 The trial court denied the
motion to vacate. The court of appeals reversed and held that the trial
court abused its discretion.
Although the court of appeals recognized that the ruling on a motion to
vacate a judgment is a matter committed to the trial judge's discretion, it
held that the strong judicial policy encouraging a trial on the merits will
often justify reversal when even a slight abuse of discretion by the trial
judge has occurred.' Given the preference for disposing of a case on the
merits, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by refusing to vacate its judgment when the scheduled trial date was
close at hand.
In dissent, Associate Judge Kern maintained that the majority's position
not only set an undesirable precedent, but unduly protracted the summary
proceeding of the trial court by allowing tenant litigants to ignore court
orders with impunity." Judge Kern viewed the majority's decision as di-
luting the effectiveness and fairness of protective orders.
In Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc. ,2 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals addressed the unresolved issue in Davis: the constitution-
ality of protective orders. The court held that where an indigent failed to
comply with a court order for protective payments, his fifth amendment
due process rights were not violated when the trial court disposed of his
7. Id But see Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) and
infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
8. Davis, 431 A.2d at 24-25.
9. Id at 25. In dissent, Associate Judge Kern was not impressed by the tenant's will-
ingness to pay the entire outstanding amount in arrears. He argued that making an excep-
tion in individual cases heightened the responsibility of the already overworked Landlord
and Tenant Branch, Id at 26 (Kern, J., dissenting).
10. Id at 25 (citing Dunn v. Profitt, 408 A.2d 991, 993 (D.C. 1979); Jones v. Hunt, 298
A.2d 220, 221 (D.C. 1972)).
11. Davis, 431 A.2d at 26 (Kern, J., dissenting).
12. 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam). Associate Judge Kern, who dissented in
Davis, joined the court's opinion in Mahdi.
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claim and granted the landlord possession without a hearing on the
merits. 13
The court of appeals disposed of the tenant's due process argument by
concluding that the unique factual and legal characteristics of the land-
lord-tenant relationship warrant either the imposition of a swift, judicially
supervised mechanism for the landlord to recover his property or the crea-
tion and maintenance of a procedure where the landlord will be assured of
back-rent if he prevails on the merits.' 4 The court of appeals cited and
adopted the rationale of the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet.' 5 In
Lindsey, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon statute which
provided that the tenant was required to post security for accruing rent in
the event that the possessory action was not tried within six days. The
Supreme Court rejected the tenant's contention that housing was a funda-
mental constitutional right. 16 Since the security agreement would facilitate
rather than frustrate the landlord's right to the income, the Supreme Court
concluded that the security agreement was a viable alternative in the event
that swift repossession was not realized.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that while strik-
ing the tenant's pleadings necessarily terminates the tenancy, it would not
foreclose the tenant's opportunity to sue the landlord on a breach of con-
tract action in the Civil Division." The court also recognized that if ten-
ants were permitted to litigate after failing to comply with protective
orders, this would undoubtedly reduce the already shrinking supply of
rental housing in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, it affirmed the
trial court's decision.
Theoretically, Mahdi and Davis are not inconsistent. Mahdi stands for
the proposition that protective orders are not violative of the due process
clause. Davis represents the rule that although protective orders are not
violative of the due process clause per se, the trial court must weigh the
equities involved before striking the tenant's pleadings for noncompliance
with the protective order or before refusing to vacate a default judgment.
Practically, however, Mahdi and Davis are inconsistent. They encourage
undue speculation as to the equities involved in each case. Judge Kern's
dissent in Davis, later vindicated when he joined the plurality in Mahdi,
13. Id at 1086.
14. Id at 1088-89. The court noted that because the tenant was in possession of the
landlord's property, the tenant could deprive the landlord of both possession and rent until
the landlord sued for repossession.
15. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
16. Id at 74.
17. Mahdi, 433 A.2d at 1089-90.
[Vol. 31:830
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shows the inherent unfairness and burden placed on the trial judge and the
landlord litigant if the tenant is allowed to maintain his cause of action.
The approach taken by the Davis court is difficult to reconcile with its
facts. Despite the trial court's conclusion that the tenant willfully violated
the terms of the protective order (i.e., the failure to make payments for
three months, the failure to request permission to make late payments, the
late payment of rent during the preceding two months, and the tenant's
failure to advise her attorney of her nonpayment),' 8 the court of appeals
found an abuse of discretion. Davis indicates that a tenant who proffers the
entire amount in outstanding protective payments before trial will be af-
forded the opportunity to proceed to trial on the merits, despite the default
on protective payments.
The confusion generated by Davis and Mahdi is exacerbated by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals' summary affirmance of a lower court's
decision to strike a tenant's answer where he failed to make three pay-
ments as required by a protective order. Although the unpublished deci-
sion of Diamond v. Central City Property Management Co. " does not have
precedential value, it nevertheless supports the rationale and result
reached in Mahdi.
The approach taken by the Mahdi court is better supported by legal rea-
soning and precedent. Although the Mahdi court was sensitive to the rare
circumstances where the imposition of a protective order and the conse-
quent judgment of possession would at times "make any human judge
wince and grit his teeth,"2 it upheld the validity of the protective order as
a tool to maintain the delicate balance between landlord and tenant rights.
B. Disbursement of Protective Payments
Frequently, when a landlord initiates a possessory action, the tenant will
counterclaim, asserting that the nonpayment of rent was due to the exist-
ence of housing code violations.2 The tenant will still be required to pay
protective payments into the court, although, generally, the payments will
not be disbursed until there is a final disposition on the merits. This proce-
18. Davis, 431 A.2d at 25.
19. No. 80-769 (D.C. Mar. 19, 1981).
20. 433 A.2d at 1088.
21. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In this im-
portant decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
interpreted the District of Columbia Housing Regulations as implying a warranty of habita-
bility in all leases. Thus, a housing code violation will breach this warranty resulting in the
suspension of the tenant's rental obligation. When the landlord sues for possession, the ten-
ant may raise the code violations as an equitable defense to the nonpayment of rent.
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dure provides the landlord with an adequate opportunity to prove that the
tenant unjustifiably failed to make the rental payments, without jeopardiz-
ing the tenant's opportunity to prove the existence of housing code
violations.
In McNeal v. Habib,"2 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ex-
amined the procedure to dispose of protective payments in the event the
possessory action never comes to trial. In McNeal, the lower court failed to
grant the tenant an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the rental
value should be abated due to the alleged housing code violations.2 3
Rather, it simply released the protective funds to the landlord when the
possessory action became moot.2 4 Because a trial on the merits was never
conducted, the tenant was precluded from proving either the existence of
housing code violations or the reduced fair rental value of the property.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that due process considerations
entitled the tenant to prove the abated rental value during the period of
occupancy "while the protective order was in effect."2"
In the recent case of Arm wood v. RentalAssociates, Inc. ,26 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals expanded McNeal and held that, although an
existing settlement agreement between the tenant and the landlord will
prevent the tenant from claiming a diminution in rental value due to hous-
ing code violations that existed before the settlement agreement, the land-
lord's failure to correct the violations requires an evidentiary hearing on
whether any future rent should be reduced. 7
Under a protective order granted on defendant's motion, the tenant in
Armwood was required to pay rent for February and March, 1979, into the
court registry pending a trial on the merits.2u In a subsequent settlement,
the landlord and tenant agreed that the money already paid into the court
would be divided equally, the tenant would pay the April rent directly to
the landlord, and the landlord would make all the itemized repairs by
April 30, 1979. If the landlord did not make the prescribed repairs, the
tenant would be allowed to pay May's rent to the court.2 9 The landlord
failed to make the requisite repairs by April 30; accordingly, the tenant
paid the rent for May, June, and July, 1979 into the court registry.3"
22. 346 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1975).
23. Id at 510-11.
24. Id at 511.
25. Id at 514.
26. 429 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam).
27. Id at 191.
28. Id at 190-91.




Although the housing code violations were not corrected for more than
three months after the settlement, the trial judge ordered that the protec-
tive payments be released to the landlord upon learning that the landlord
completed the repairs on August 8, 1979. In addition, the trial court barred
the tenant from introducing evidence of existing violations and their effect
on the value of the rental unit during that time. The court of appeals re-
versed, finding that the landlord's untimely completion of repairs would
not moot any of the tenant's additional claims for abatement in rental
value.3
Thus, Armwood represents the logical extension of McNeal. Armwood
ensures that, regardless of whether the tenant has entered into a settlement
agreement, a breach of that settlement agreement by the landlord will en-
able the tenant to assert his rights. If a party agrees to settle, he will only be
estopped from bringing suit on terms which conffict with the settlement
agreement. Although, in Armwood, only the timetable for the completion
of repairs was at issue, the Armwood rationale may be extended to include
other breaches of settlement agreements. Armwood advances both the ten-
ant's due process rights and the "settlement agreement" as alternatives to a
disposition on the merits.
C. Appealability of Protective Orders
In Dameron v. Capitol House Associates Limited Partnership,32 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the protective order had no
permanent impact on the rights of the parties; it was merely a preliminary
action by the lower court and not a final order within the meaning of sec-
tion 22-721(a)(1) of the D.C. Code.33 Therefore, the protective order was
not appealable to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
The tenants in Dameron refused to pay an increase in rent authorized by
the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office. Instead, they
merely tendered their checks in the amount of the old rent. Accordingly,
the landlord filed suit for possession based on nonpayment of rent and
subsequently moved for a protective order. In addition, the landlord re-
quested that he be allowed to withdraw from the court registry the "old"
rent, leaving only the amount of the disputed increase in the registry.34
31. Id
32. 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981). For a complete discussion of the Dameron decision, see
Note, Dameron v. Capitol House Associates Limited Partnershp. Protective Orders to Provide
Rent Collecting, Loopholefor Landlords? 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 615 (1982).
33. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 585. Section 22-721(a)(1) is currently codified at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-721(a)(1) (1981).
34. 431 A.2d at 582. The tenants alleged housing code violations in order to compel the
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After a hearing, the lower court ruled that the fund which was "pre-
served in the registry. . . was much more than adequate to fully protect
the defendants' [tenants] need for any security. . . .,3 Consequently, the
lower court ordered that portion of the protective payments which consti-
tuted the "old," undisputed rent to be released to the landlord. The tenants
were subsequently denied a stay of the lower court's order in both the
lower court and the court of appeals. 36 The tenants appealed arguing that
the order violated McNeal v. Habib37 because the lower court released the
funds without a full evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction because the lower court's order was neither a "fi-
nal" order nor an order that came under the appeal provisions of section
11-721(a)(2) of the D.C. Code.38
Concluding that a protective order was merely a preliminary interim
order of a provisional nature which effects no permanent disposition of the
property,39 the court of appeals held that the protective order did not sat-
isfy the requirements of a final order.4 ° The court was persuaded that a
protective order, being a creature of equity,41 could be revised at any time
during the action.42 Furthermore, the purpose of the protective order was
to ensure that the harm of excessive delay attendant in landlord-tenant
disputes was mitigated.4 3 To permit the protective order itself to be appeal-
able would frustrate this basic value because appealability would cause
additional delay in the summary process of the landlord-tenant
proceeding.'
In the alternative, the tenants argued that the protective order was ap-
pealable as an interlocutory order under section 11-721(a)(2)(C) of the
court to reject the landlord's request for a "pass through" of the "old," undisputed rent. The
lower court held that the de minimis nature of the claim combined with the fact that the
violations had been remedied, mitigated against the validity of the tenants' claims. Appar-
ently, the tenants were attempting to exert economic pressure on the landlord in their effort
to cut off his access to rental income.
35. Id
36. Id
37. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
38. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 582.
39. Id at 584.
40. Id at 586.
41. Id at 583-84.
42. Id at 585.
43. Id at 586.
44. Id The court of appeals did, however, note one caveat to the Dameron holding. If
the trial court's order directs immediate execution of judgment or delivery of property to a
litigant, and the opposing party suffered or will suffer irreparable injury as a result of the
order, the court of appeals will not foreclose review.
[Vol. 31:830
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D.C. Code.4" This statute allows the court of appeals to hear cases result-
ing from orders "changing or affecting the possession of property."" The
court of appeals was unconvinced that the statute permits a protective or-
der to be appealed. First, since the statute was designed to maintain the
status quo between parties regarding property, and since the protective or-
der was intended to protect the status quo between the landlord and the
tenant, no statutory goal would be advanced by allowing an appeal.47 Sec-
ond, the statute was inapplicable because money was the only type of
property which was exchanged or affected. Since any danger of loss could
be remedied at the conclusion of the litigation, the danger which section
11-721(a)(2)(C) was designed to prevent did not exist here.48
Dameron represents an attempt by the court of appeals to disarm the
tenant of a dilatory weapon which could potentially erode the effectiveness
of a protective order. 49 Had the Dameron court held that the protective
order was appealable, the delicate balance which the protective order was
designed to effect between landlord and tenant could have been destroyed.
Not only would the landlord have to forego rent until the commencement
of a suit for possession, but he would have to wander through a procedural
maze before he would receive any equitable relief. In addition, because an
appeal of a protective order would stay any interim payments that the
court may have granted during the trial, the landlord could suffer a great
deal of harm as a result of his former rental income being tied up in the
court registry.
II. NOTICE
Under the provisions of the Rental Housing Act of 1977,50 a tenant vio-
lating an obligation of the tenancy may not be evicted unless proper notice
45. 431 A.2d at 587.
46. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721(a)(2)(C) (1981).
47. Dameron, 431 A.2d at 587. The court reasoned in Dameron that the protective order
preserved the status of the parties which existed prior to the controversy: the landlord re-
ceived the "old" rent and the tenant remained in possession of the property.
48. Id
49. The tenants in Dameron were attempting to prevent the landlord from effecting a
valid and approved rent increase. Not only did they appeal the issuance of the protective
order and the subsequent release of protective funds, but they also raised de minimis hous-
ing code violations in order to avoid payment of any protective funds. The court of appeals
refused to permit the protective order from becoming an economic weapon of unreasonable
proportion.
50. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1681 to 45-1699.27 (Supp. VII 1980). The Rental Housing
Act of 1977 has expired and been replaced by the Rental Housing Act of 1980, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-1501 to 45-1597 (1981).
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is served, informing the tenant of the violation."1 The tenant must then
receive notice to quit52 as a condition precedent to a suit for possession.
The question presented in the recent case of Jones v. Brawner Co. 53 was
whether technically defective service of the notice to quit would be a valid
defense in a suit for possession where the tenant had actually received no-
tice to quit.
According to a Rental Accommodations Commission regulation54
promulgated under the Rental Housing Act of 1977," 5 the tenant is es-
topped from defending a suit for possession on the grounds of defective
service where the tenant has actual notice. Under section 45-906 of the
D.C. Code, 6 however, actual receipt of notice to quit will not bar a tenant
from defending on the ground of improper service. Concluding that the
Rental Housing Act of 1977 intended to supplement rather than supplant
tenants' rights, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Jones held
that the notice provisions of section 45-906 controlled over the Commis-
sion's regulation. 7 Accordingly, the court held the regulation was inappli-
cable where proper service of the notice to quit was disputed. 8
The landlord in Jones sued for possession of the tenant's apartment
based on the tenant's alleged willful and consistent failure to pay rent
promptly on the first of each month as required by the lease. Subsequently,
the landlord served the tenant with a notice to quit.5 9 Instead of serving
the notice in compliance with section 45-906, the landlord merely slipped
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1699.6(b)(1) (Supp. VII 1980) (currently codified at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 45-1561(b) (1981)).
52. A notice to quit is a written notice given by a landlord to a tenant which informs the
tenant of the landlord's desire to repossess the property. The tenant is required to leave the
premises at a time designated in the notice to quit.
53. 435 A.2d 54 (D.C. 1981).
54. See 25 D.C. Reg. 2652 (1978). The regulation provides in part: "[a]ctual receipt of
service shall bar any claim of defective service except for timeliness."
55. The Commission's regulation was promulgated under D.C. CODE § 45-
1699.26(a)(4) (Supp. VII 1980) (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1595(a)(4)
(1981)), which states that service upon a person may be completed by "any other means that
is in conformity with an order of the Commission or the Rent Administrator in any proceed-
ing." (emphasis added).
56. D.C. CODE § 45-906 (1973) provides:
Every notice to the tenant to quit shall be served upon him personally, if he can be
found, and if he cannot be found it shall be sufficient service of said notice to
deliver the same to some person of proper age upon the premises, and in the ab-
sence of such tenant or person to post the same in some conspicuous place upon the
leased premises.
(emphasis added) (currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1981)).
57. Jones, 435 A.2d at 55-56.
58. d at 56.
59. Id at 54.
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the notice under the tenant's apartment door.60 Notwithstanding that the
service of the notice was defective, the lower court found sufficient evi-
dence to conclude that the tenant had actual notice. Consequently, the
lower court ruled that the notice was properly served under the Rental
Housing Act.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed. The
court reasoned that because the Rental Housing Act was designed to give
the tenant the additional safeguard of receiving a notice to cure (a notice to
the tenant that if he continues to violate the terms of the lease the landlord
may begin eviction proceedings),62 it was inappropriate to apply the Com-
mission regulation here when dealing with a notice to quit. Additionally,
since the Rental Housing Act did not amend the clear requirements of
section 45-906,63 it was reasonable to conclude that section 45-906, rather
than section 45-1699.26 of the Rental Housing Act, would continue to con-
trol in notice to quit disputes.
Although the Rental Housing Act of 1977 has expired and has been re-
placed by the Rental Housing Act of 1980, Jones has continuing applica-
bility because the notice provisions of the 1977 Act have been incorporated
verbatim into section 45-1595 of the 1980 Act.' The Jones rationale in-
structs the Rental Accommodation Commission to consider other provi-
sions of the D.C. Code which deal with landlord-tenant matters when
drafting and promulgating its regulations. Furthermore, Jones mandates
that absent an express amendment to section 45-906,65 any service of no-
tice to quit which does not comply with the provision will be struck down
as defective. Personal service on the tenant continues as the clearly pre-
ferred method; any substituted service should be employed only as a last
60. Id.
61. Id at 55.
62. Id The notice to cure, which is required under the Rental Housing Act of 1977, is
neither a substitute for nor an addition to the notice to quit. It is intended to supplement the
existing statutory protections afforded the tenant. The notice to cure merely entitles the land-
lord, at his election and after the tenant has failed to cure the alleged violation in the thirty
day statutory period, to begin the eviction proceedings. Consequently, the landlord must still
file the notice to quit in accordance with § 45-906 if he elects to begin the eviction process.
63. Although the Rental Housing Act of 1977 did repeal the Rental Accommodations
Act of 1975, D.C. CODE §§ 45-1631 to 45-1674 (Supp. V 1978), it did not modify or amend
the provisions of § 45-906.
64. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1595(a)(4) (1981).
65. Section 45-906 of the 1973 D.C. Code is currently codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-
1406 (1981).
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resort and only in strict compliance with section 45-906.66
Patrick J Heneghan
66. See Moody v. Winchester Management Corp., 321 A.2d 562, 564 (D.C. 1974).
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